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BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals from its opinion in State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, 197 P.3d 99 
(Addendum A). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (WestSupp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the court of appeals impose a burden of proof greater than 
required by the Fourth Amendment by requiring the State to produce "clear and 
positive" testimony that the consent was " unequivocal" and freely given? 
2. Did the court of appeals err in its assessment of probable cause when 
considering whether the warrantless blood draw was justified under the exigent 
circumstances exception? 
3. Did the court of appeals impose a burden of proof for demonstrating 
inevitable discovery that is greater than that required under State v. Topanotes, 
2003 UT 30, 76 P.3d 1159? 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision 
of the court of appeals for correctness, which "turns on whether that court 
accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of 
review." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^ 9,22 P.3d 1242. A trial court's ruling on a 
motion to suppress is reviewed for correctness, including its application of the 
law to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, % 15,103 P.3d 699. The trial court's 
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 
UT 94, \ 11,100 P.3d 1222. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 23, 2004, the defendant, Susan Tripp, was involved in an 
automobile-motorcycle accident that resulted in the death of the motorcyclist. 
R. 3-4. Tripp was charged with automobile homicide, a third degree felony, and 
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failure to yield the right of way, a class C misdemeanor. R. 2-4. Tripp moved to 
suppress the evidence from a blood draw taken at the scene of the accident, 
arguing that her consent was involuntary and that the blood draw was not 
justified under the exigent circumstances exception. R. 36-58. The trial court 
denied Tripp's motion. R. 60-62, 65-146,157-63 (Addendum B). After a four-
day trial, a jury found Tripp guilty of both counts as charged. R. 248-57, 299. 
The trial court sentenced Tripp to a prison term of zero-to-five years and a 
concurrent jail term of 90 days, but suspended the sentence and placed Tripp on 
supervised probation for 36 months. R. 397-400. As part of probation, the court 
ordered Tripp to serve 360 days in jail with no early release, complete 200 hours 
of community service, receive substance abuse treatment, and pay full and 
complete restitution. R. 397-400, 452-53. Tripp appealed and the court of 
appeals reversed. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388. The court held that Tripp's consent 
was not voluntary, ^ 14-17, that the blood draw was not justified under the 
exigent circumstances exception, ^ 18-22, and that the blood alcohol evidence 
would not have inevitably been discovered, ^ 23-25. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
About ten minutes before 7:00 p.m. on April 23,2004, Tripp was driving 
eastbound on the Old Bingham Highway in Salt Lake County. R. 533:57; Tripp, 
2008 UT App 388, f^ 3. After stopping for a stop sign at the U-l l l intersection, 
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Tripp pulled out and collided with Daniel Pracht, a motorcyclist who was 
traveling southbound on U-111. R. 533: 4, 9-10, 57. A Life Flight helicopter 
transported Pracht to University Medical Center, but he died of his injuries the 
following day. R. 533: 9; Obituary, Deseret News, April 28, 2004. 
* * * 
When Officer Doug Saunders arrived at the accident scene a few minutes 
after 7:00 p.m., Tripp was sitting in another car with her husband, who had 
arrived earlier. R. 533: 11, 16, 40-41, 49, 51, 64, 76, 85. Her son and others 
arrived shortly after. R. 533: 48, 76. Tripp was crying and visibly shaken. R. 
533: 43, 48, 52. She was also smoking a cigarette and, at the insistence of her 
husband, drinking from a large bottle of water that was brought to her. R. 533: 
47-48, 53-54, 56, 65, 70, 77r, 85-86, 89. 
Tripp told Officer Saunders that she had stopped at the stop sign, but did 
not see the motorcycle until after the collision. R. 533:57. Saunders asked Tripp 
whether she had consumed any alcohol or was on any prescription medications. 
R. 533:43-44,46,51-53. Tripp denied any such use. R. 533:44,52. Although he 
did not smell the odor of alcohol or observe other indicia of impairment, 
Saunders asked for Tripp's consent to do a blood draw. R. 533: 44, 46-47, 52. 
Tripp responded that "she didn't like needles and did not want to take the test/7 
but offered to submit to a urinalysis instead. R. 533: 44-47, 53-54. 
-4-
Cecelia Budd, a victim advocate for West Jordan City, arrived at 
approximately 7:30 p.m. and remained with Tripp tliroughout the accident 
investigation. R. 533: 75-77,82-83. When she first poked her head into the car to 
see how Tripp was doing, Budd smelled the odor of alcohol, but could not tell 
whether it was coming from Tripp. R. 533: 76, 83. 
Just after 8:00 p.m., automobile homicide investigator Daniel Roberts 
arrived at the scene. R. 533: 7-9. After being briefed on the situation, Roberts 
also asked Tripp for consent, but she again refused because of her fear of 
needles. R. 533:10-13,45-46,54-56,65,70. Roberts explained the seriousness of 
the situation, his belief they could work around her fear, and the blood 
technician's skill in conducting relatively quick and painless draws. R. 533:11-
16, 64. Tripp said she would give blood only if they "didn't use a needle to get 
it," but both conceded to knowing of no other way. R. 533:12-13. 
Roberts left Tripp with advocate Budd to see if she could get her to 
"become more relaxed to the idea of having a blood draw." R. 533: 14-15. 
Roberts returned to visit with Tripp twice more, "trying to convince her to 
overcome her fear of the needles." R. 533:15,17. But "the more [he and others] 
tried to convince her, the more defiant she [and her family] became." R. 533:17. 
When Detective Roberts first observed Tripp, he noticed that her eyes 
were red and that she was shaking and nervous. R. 533:11. Initially, Roberts 
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assumed that Tripp's condition was the result of ctying. R. 533:11. However, 
the longer he visited with Tripp, the more suspicious he became that she was 
impaired. R. 533: 14. As he spoke with Tripp over the next 45 minutes to an 
hour, Roberts noted that the redness did not dissipate as he would expect if it 
had been caused from crying. R. 533:14,36-37. Although the tears in her eyes 
cleared up, the redness remained. R. 533: 36. He also noted that Tripp was 
smoking continually and seemed unconcerned about the victim. R. 533:14. 
After his third attempt to obtain consent failed, and in the face of 
increasingly hostile family members, Detective Roberts informed Tripp that he 
would obtain a warrant for a blood draw and placed her in the backseat of his 
patrol car. R. 533:16-18, 71-74, 78,100. Advocate Budd joined Tripp Inside the 
patrol car, but Tripp's family and friends were not permitted to remain with her. 
R. 533: 71-72, 78, 88. While in the patrol car, Budd smelled the odor of alcohol 
emanating from Tripp's person. R. 533: 78-79,86-87. She also noticed that Tripp 
slurred her words. R. 533: 84. Budd reported to officers at the scene that she 
smelled the alcohol. R. 533: 84. 
Brian Davis, the blood technician, arrived at the scene soon after Tripp 
was placed in the patrol car. R. 533: 18, 91. Detective Roberts explained to 
Davis that Tripp had refused to submit to a blood draw, that "it looked like it 
was going to take ... a couple of hours to get the warrant," and that he would 
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"call him back once [he] obtained the warrant." R. 533:18,99-100. When Davis 
learned that Tripp's reluctance stemmed from her fear of needles, he responded, 
"[I]f that's all it is, let me talk to her. I'm pretty good at getting them to work 
around their fear of needles." R. 533:18, 91-92. 
When Davis approached Tripp about a blood draw, she was very upset 
and told him that she was terrified of needles. R. 533: 79-80, 87, 93-94. She 
explained that she would not even allow her doctor to draw her blood. R. 533: 
93. Davis tried to reassure her that he was very good and that it was really not 
that hard. R. 533: 93. But Tripp "insisted] that she was very afraid of needles, 
[and] that she wanted her husband to come over and reassure her through this 
process." R. 533: 93. Davis explained that Tripp had the right to refuse a blood 
draw, the right to counsel, and the right to remain silent. R. 533: 93,102. After 
speaking with Tripp, Davis believed he "could probably get around [her] fear of 
needles." R. 533:93,102. Davis returned to Officer Roberts and told him that he 
believed "we can probably go ahead and do this. We've got her reassured and 
talked into this . . . . " R. 533: 94; R. 533: 66. 
When Davis returned to the car to do the blood draw, a plain clothes 
officer accompanied him to witness the procedure. R. 533: 66-67, 72, 94, 96. 
Davis said to Tripp, "You know, just let me put the tourniquet on your arm, see 
if we can find a spot that would be easy to do this." R. 533: 94-95. Although she 
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was still terrified, Tripp "very comfortably at that point let [Davis] try that." R. 
533: 95. She "stuck her arm out for [Davis]" and said, "Okay, we'll go ahead 
and do that." R. 533: 67, 71, 80-81, 87, 95. Davis did not believe Tripp knew at 
that time that he had all of his other equipment ready. R. 533: 95. Davis rolled 
up her sleeve and applied the tourniquet. R. 533: 95. He then told her that it 
was an easy site and they could "go ahead and [take] care of [it]." R. 533: 95. 
Although the plain clothes officer described Tripp's body language as 
"pulling away," he testified that she did not pull her arm away, nor did she 
object in any way. R. 533: 67,95,97. Kneeling in front of Tripp, advocate Budd 
held Tripp's other hand and tried to calm her as Davis prepared to make the 
blood draw. R. 533: 80. She told Tripp that she had seen Davis do blood draws 
before, that he was good and fast, and assured her that he would be very gentle. 
R. 533: 88. She then told Tripp to look at her, not at the needle, and take a deep 
breath. R. 533: 80-81, 88, 95. Davis then drew a blood sample. R. 533: 95-97. 
After the blood was drawn, Tripp immediately calmed, expressed surprise that 
Davis had finished, and commented to advocate Budd that "it wasn' t as bad as 
she thought" it would be. R. 533: 67-78, 81. 
The toxicology report revealed that Tripp's blood-alcohol level was .08. 
SE14. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Consent to search. The trial court found that officers successfully eased 
Tripp's fear of needles and concluded that she voluntarily consented to the 
blood draw. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the State did not 
produce " 'clear and positive testimony' that Tripp 'unequivocally] and freely' 
consented to having her blood drawn." Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, f^ 16 (citation 
omitted). This Court should reverse. 
The court of appeals applied the wrong burden of proof. The appropriate 
burden of proof on a motion to suppress is the preponderance of the evidence 
standard. The "clear, positive, and unequivocal" standard is a variation of the 
more rigorous "clear and convincing" standard, designed to give effect to a 
presumption against waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. The presumption 
against waiver test was rejected by this court in State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 
P.3d 1073, and State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650. 
When the appropriate standard is applied, the record supports the trial 
court's determination that Tripp voluntarily consented to the blood draw. 
II. Exigent circumstances. In any event, the court of appeals should have 
affirmed on the alternative ground that the blood draw was justified under the 
exigent circumstances exception. Under that exception, the State must not only 
demonstrate an exigency that justifies a warrantless blood draw, it must also 
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establish probable cause as traditionally required for any search for evidence. 
The court of appeals concluded that probable cause did not exist and did not 
therefore reach the exigency issue. It's assessment of probable cause was 
erroneous. 
In assessing probable cause, the court of appeals considered only those 
facts that detracted from a probable cause finding. It failed to consider those 
factors supporting probable cause. The court of appeals did not consider 
Detective Roberts' testimony that he became suspicious Tripp was impaired 
because (1) the redness in her eyes was not dissipating as he would expect if it 
had been caused by crying; (2) she was continually smoking, and (3) she 
exhibited no concern for the victim. The court failed to consider the 
circumstances of the accident, i.e., Tripp inexplicably pulled in front of the 
motorcyclist, despite an unobstructed view. And most significantly, the court 
did not consider testimony from both the victim advocate and blood technician 
that they could smell the odor of alcohol from Tripp's person. The court's 
failure to consider "all the circumstances" resulted in an erroneous probable 
cause determination. 
Although the court of appeals did not address the exigency requirement, 
this Court should do so, rather than remand to the court of appeals. The 
evidence demonstrated that the officers had been investigating the accident for 
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approximately one hour and that it would have taken additional time to secure 
a warrant. In light of these facts, together with the evanescent nature of blood-
alcohol evidence and the severity of the accident, the exigencies of the situation 
were sufficient to justify a warrantless blood draw. 
III. Inevitable discovery. Finally, contrary to the opinion of the court of 
appeals, the State established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that blood-
alcohol evidence ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful 
means. That Detective Roberts would have pursued a warrant was not 
"speculative/7 as held by the court of appeals. Roberts testified that when he 
failed to obtain Tripp's consent, he placed her in custody and told her he would 
pursue a warrant. He testified, and told the blood technician, that it would take 
a couple of hours. He explained at trial that he was going to gather information 
from others at the scene, prepare the affidavit, review it with a prosecutor, and 
secure authorization from a judge. The only reason he did not pursue this 
course was that the blood technician obtained consent before he could complete 
the process. 
As discussed above, the facts and circumstances confronting the officers at 
the scene established probable cause that Tripp was intoxicated, justifying 
issuance of the warrant. Although the blood-alcohol evidence would have 




THE STATE DEMONSTRATED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY 
CONSENTED TO THE BLOOD DRAW 
The district court denied Susan Tripp's challenge to the blood draw taken 
after the accident, concluding that she 'Voluntarily consented7' to it. R. 160. The 
court recognized that Tripp initially refused to submit to the blood draw "based 
. . . on her fear of needles," but found "that at the time of the blood draw [her] 
fear was resolved." R. 160. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the 
prosecution "failed to meet its burden . . . to demonstrate that Tripp voluntarily 
gave consent." Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, at <[ 26. This Court should reverse 
because the court of appeals imposed a stricter burden of proof upon the State 
than is required under the Fourth Amendment. 
A. A warrantless search is reasonable under th e Fourth Amendm ent 
if the State establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the search was conducted pursuant to a voluntary consent. 
"[0]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of 
both a wrarrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to 
consent." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). To be valid, a 
consent to search must be " 'freely and voluntarily given/ " i.e., the co rtsent may 
"not be coerced, by explicit or implied means, by implied threat or co\ ert force." 
Id. at 222, 228 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)). In 
short, a consent must be " 'the product of an essentially free and unconstrained 
choice by its maker/ " Id. at 225 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 
602 (1961)). If it is, the consent is valid and the fruits of the search are admitted. 
If it is not, the consent is invalid and the fruits of the search are suppressed. 
When relying upon the consent exception to justify a search, the 
prosecution " 'has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and 
voluntarily given/" Id. at 222 (quoting Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548 (1968)). As 
explained by this Court in State v. Hansen, "[t]he appropriate standard to 
determine voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances, and the burden of 
proof is by [a] preponderance of the evidence." 2002 UT125, ^ 56, 63 P.3d 650. 
Under the totality of the circumstances test, "a court should carefully scrutinize 
both the details of the detention, and the characteristics of the defendant." Id. 
(citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225). 
B. The court of appeals applied a stricter standard for proving 
voluntariness than is required under the Fourth Amendment. 
In its opinion below, the court of appeals correctly held that "[t]he State 
. . . has the burden of establishing that consent was [voluntarily] given," based 
on the totality of the circumstances. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, at f 14. But rather 
than reviewing the State's evidence under the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, the court of appeals "look[ed] to see if [the State produced] clear and 
positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given/" Id. 
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(quoting State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 293 (Utah App. 1998)). The court 
concluded that "[g]iven the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that 
there is 'clear and positive testimony' that Tripp "unequivocally] and freely' 
consented to having her blood drawn." Id. at f^ 16 (quoting Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 
293). The "clear, positive, and unequivocal" standard of proof used by the court 
of appeals imposes a burden that is not required under the Fourth Amendment. 
The "clear, positive, and unequivocal" standard has its roots in the three-
part Ham test once used by the court of appeals for determining whether a 
consent was voluntarily given: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently given"; 
(2) the government must prove consent was given without duress 
or coercion, express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first 
two standards, we] indulge every reasonable presumption against 
the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be 
convincing evidence that such rights were waived. 
State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433,439 (Utah App. 1996) (brackets in original) (citations 
omitted). This Court, however, rejected the Ham test, in part, because 
"voluntariness must be determined, not from a demonstration of waiver, but 
from 'the totality of all the circumstances.'" State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 45,37 
P.3d 1073 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). The Court instead adheres to 
the straightforward analysis of Schneckloth: the State "must show consent was 
given without duress or coercion." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 57. "[T]he 
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appropriate s tandard. . . is the totality of the circumstances test, and the burden 
of proof is by [a] preponderance of the evidence." Id. at^ f 56. 
The underlying rationale for the presumption against waiver was that 
because a finding of consent "nullifies a constitutional right," it "should be 
approached with caution, and with full cognizance of... the unlikelihood of the 
waiver of a basic personal right." Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680,684 (10th 
Cir. 1962), abrogated by United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1991).] The 
"clear, positive, and unequivocal" standard of proof gave effect to that 
presumption by requiring that the consent be "unequivocal," that the evidence 
be "convincing," and that the testimony be "clear and positive." Villano, 310 
F.2d at 684. Simply put, it is a variation of the "clear and convincing" standard, 
which "is typically employed . . . where a particular claim is disfavored on 
policy grounds." A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Cliaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d 
1020,1045 (Fed. Cir. 1992). But as explained in Schneckloth, "'it is no part of the 
policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to discourage 
citizens from [consenting to searches]/" Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243 (citation 
omitted). Accordingly, Ham's "clear, positive, and unequivocal" standard 
should be discarded along with the presumption against waiver. 
1
 The Ham test was taken from Villano. See Eisner, 2001 UT 99, f 44. 
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It has been argued that a stricter standard of proof is required to 
adequately protect the constitutional values the exclusionary rule is designed to 
serve. See Lego v. Twoniey, 404 U.S. 477, 488 (1972). The Supreme Court has 
rejected this argument. Id. The exclusionary rule is a harsh remedy, keeping 
from the jury evidence of guilt" 'for reasons wholly apart from enhancing the 
reliability of verdicts/" Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,168 (1986). As a result, 
application of the rule often results in "letting guilty and possibly dangerous 
defendants go free — something that 'offends basic concepts of the criminal 
justice system/" Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 701 (2009) (citation 
omitted). In light of these substantial costs, the Supreme Court has concluded 
that "the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should [be] no 
greater . . . than proof by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,178 (1974); accord Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1f 56. "[A]dded 
burdens on the already difficult task of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
[should not be imposed] by enlarging the barrier to placing evidence of 
unquestioned truth before juries." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 n.5 (1984). 
C. The State demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
Defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw. 
Applying the proper preponderance of the evidence standard, the trial 
court's ruling should be affirmed. The court of appeals suggested that Davis 
obtained Defendant's consent through trickery. See Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, ^ j 
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17 (stating that Davis "immediately dr[e]w her blood" after making the 
"ambiguous comment" that "we can go ahead and [take] care of this"). The 
evidence, however, supported the trial court's finding, R. 159: f 15, that "[w]hen 
asked by Mr. Davis if she would consent to the blood draw, the defendant 
voluntarily extended her arm." See R. 533: 67, 71, 80-81, 87-88, 94-95 
(demonstrating that Davis told Defendant he found an easy site and that they 
could go ahead and do it and that Budd told Defendant to not look at the needle 
and take a deep breath). The court of appeals suggested that Defendant tried to 
pull her arm away to prevent a blood draw. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, f^ 17. 
Again, this interpretation is contrary to the trial court's express finding that 
Defendant "never tried to withdraw her arm and she never said 'no' or 'stop,'" 
R. 159, f 16, and the evidence which amply supports that finding. R. 533:67,80, 
95 (demonstrating that the pulling away was in the form of body language only 
and that Defendant never attempted to withdraw her arm). 
The court of appeals also suggests that Defendant's consent was in 
response to a threat by Officer Roberts that he would secure a warrant if she did 
not consent. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, If 17. But the evidence demonstrates that 
the officer's indication that he was going to obtain a warrant was not a means 
used to obtain her consent. See R. 533:16-17,73,78. Additionally, and as found 
by the trial court, Davis "reviewed with the defendant her right to remain silent, 
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her right to counsel, and her right to refuse consent" — a fact the court of appeals 
fails to consider. See R. 159: f 14; R. 533: 93, 102. This Court in Hansen 
specifically recognized that "'officer[s] who include[ ] such a warning in [their] 
request for consent undoubtedly present[ ] a stronger case for a fHiding of 
voluntariness/ , / Hansen, 2002 UT125, f 59 n.6 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 
33, 52 n.12 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). 
In sum, when the appropriate standard is applied, the evidence is 
sufficient to sustain the trial court's determination that Defendant voluntarily 
consented to the blood draw. This Court should reverse the court o f appeals' 
holding to the contrary. 
II. 
THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW WAS SUPPORTED BY 
PROBABLE CAUSE AND JUSTIFIED BY THE EXIGENCIES OF 
THE SITUATION 
On direct appeal, the State argued that the court of appeals could also 
affirm the trial court's ruling on the alternative ground of exigent circumstances. 
See Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, f^ 18. The court of appeals rejected the State's 
alternative argument, holding that police did not have probable cause to believe 
that Tripp was impaired. Id. at f^ 22. This Court should reverse because the 
court of appeals failed to take account of facts which supported a finding of 
probable cause. 
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A. A warrantless search for evidence under the exigent 
circumstances exception requires a threshold showing of 
probable cause. 
"One class of exceptions to the warrant requirement is exigent 
circumstances/' State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, f^ 16,156 P.3d 771. Under this 
exception, a warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment when 
"'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so 
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable." Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,393-94 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 
451,456 (1948)). In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream may 
create an exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw under the exigent 
circumstances exception. Accord Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15. 
Just as a search for evidence under a warrant requires probable cause, so 
too does a search for evidence under the exigent circumstances exception. See 
Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (holding that "police officers need . . . 
probable cause plus exigent circumstances" to conduct a warrantless search), hi 
discussing this threshold showing in the context of a warrantless blood draw, 
the Supreme Court in Schmerber held that police must have "a clear indication 
that in fact... evidence [of intoxication] will be found." 384 U.S. at 769-70. This 
Court has held that Schmerber's "clear indication" requirement "impose[s] a 
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heightened standard for determining probable cause that evidence will be found 
in the context of searches involving bodily intrusions/' State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 
61, f 27,147 P.3d 425; accord Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, ^ 25 (holding that Schmerber 
"impose[d] a more rigorous standard for probable cause"). The Court misreads 
Schmerber. 
The question in Schmerber was "whether the police were justified in 
requiring [Schmerber] to submit to [a] blood test/r following a serious injury 
accident that resulted in Schmerber's arrest for driving under the influence. 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-69. The Supreme Court first addressed the question of 
whether the blood draw was justified under the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception, which gives police "an unrestricted 'right/" without independent 
justification, " ' to search the person of the accused [for weapons and evidence] 
when legally arrested/" Id. at 769 (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 
392 (1914)). The Supreme Court held that the search incident to arrest exception 
does not extend "to searches involving intrusions beyond the body's surface." 
Id. at 769. The Court held that to justify those searches, there must be a "clear 
indication" that evidence of intoxication will be found. Id. 
As noted by this Court, Schmerber "did not clearly explain what it meant 
by 'clear indication/ " Alverez, 2006 UT 61, \ 27. However, the Supreme Court's 
ensuing discussion in Schmerber makes plain that it intended no different 
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standard than the traditional probable cause standard used in all other cases 
involving a search for evidence. As discussed, the Supreme Court rejected the 
notion that a blood draw falls within the purview of a search incident to arrest, 
requiring instead a "clear indication" that the desired evidence will be found. 
Then, turning to this threshold requirement, the Supreme Court observed that 
"the facts which established probable cause to arrest in this case also suggested tlie 
... likely success of a test of [Schmerber's] blood for alcohol!' Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 
770 (emphasis added). The Court then turned to the question of whether the 
officer was required to secure a warrant or permitted to proceed without one. 
Id. The Court concluded that "[sjearch warrants are ordinarily required for 
searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less [can] be required where 
intrusions into the human body are concerned." Id. 
As noted by Justice Marshall in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 
the foregoing language in Schmerber "strongly suggests] that the 'clear 
indication' needed to justify a compulsory blood test amounted to a showing of 
probable cause." 489 U.S. 602, 644 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).2 The 
majority in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985), likewise concluded that in 
2
 Justice Marshall cited United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 
540 (1985), as a case suggesting that the "clear indication" standard is 
commensurate with the reasonable suspicion standard. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 
644. Justice Marshall did not hold that view, and neither does the State. 
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requiring a "clear indication" of intoxication, Schmerber intended to do no more 
than impose the standard probable cause requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment: "Schmerber recognized that the ordinary requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment would be the threshold requirements for conducting [a] search and 
seizure [into the body]. We noted the importance of probable cause/' (emphases 
added). This Court should likewise recognize that the "clear indication" 
language imposes the time-honored probable cause standard used in all other 
cases involving a search for evidence. 
B. The warrantless blood draw was supported by probable cause. 
Contrary to the court of appeals' holding, see Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, % <([ 
18-22, the facts and circumstances available to the officers at the time of the 
blood draw provided probable cause to believe evidence of intoxication would 
be found in a blood test. 
Probable cause "is a 'practical, nontechnical conception'" that "deal[s] 
with probabilities," not certainties. Id. at 231 (citation omitted). Although 
probable cause requires "more than mere suspicion," Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, f^ 
24, it "does not require more than a rationally based conclusion of probability." 
State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986). Simply put, probable cause 
involves "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'" Illinois v. Gates, 462 
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U.S. 213,231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,175 (1949)). 
As explained in Gates, "practical people formulate[ ] certain common-sense 
conclusions about human behavior; [law enforcement officers] are permitted to 
do the same/7 Id. at 231-32. 
In determining whether probable cause exists, "the task of the [court] is 
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances.. ., there [was] a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime [would] be found in a particular place/' Id. at 238. Like reasonable 
suspicion, "[t]he determination of whether probable cause exists . . . depends 
upon an examination of all the information available to the searching officer in 
light of the circumstances as they existed at the time the search wras made/ ' 
Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088. Moreover, "[t]he validity of the probable cause 
determination is made from the objective standpoint of a 'prudent, reasonable, 
cautious police officer... guided by his experience and training/" Id. (quoting 
United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
In this case, the court of appeals reviewed only those facts that detracted 
from a probable cause finding. It did not consider those facts which supported a 
probable cause finding. That is error. As discussed, courts must consider "all 
the circumstances" when determining the existence of probable cause. Gates, 
462 U.S. at 238. When all the facts and circumstances are considered in this case, 
the record demonstrates that there was probable cause to believe that evidence 
of intoxication would be found in a blood test. 
It is true that Officers Saunders and Monson did not notice the odor of 
alcohol on Tripp's breath or observe other indicia of impairment. See R. 533:43-
46, 51-53, 65, 69-70. However, these officers' interactions with Tripp were 
minimal. Although Officer Saunders, as the initial officer on the scene, 
questioned Tripp about the accident, he spoke with her only "briefly." R. 533: 
42,50. He stood within three feet of Tripp during the conversation, but she was 
sitting in a vehicle. R. 533:42-43. She was also smoking and "there was a heavy 
odor of smoke" about her. R. 533: 48. When Officer Monson arrived about an 
hour later, Tripp was still sitting in the car and people were still smoking. R. 
533: 64-65.3 Moreover, Monson was only minimally involved in the attempts to 
obtain Tripp's consent. R. 533: 65. And although he witnessed the blood draw, 
Tripp was sitting in the patrol vehicle and Monson was outside behind the open 
door. R. 533:96. 
Detective Roberts also arrived on the scene about an hour after the 
accident. R. 533:22. His conversations with Tripp were more extensive. When 
he first spoke with Tripp, Roberts did not observe any obvious signs of 
impairment. See R. 158: f^ 7. Tripp was shaking and nervous, and her eyes were 
3
 Officer Monson did not recall who was smoking. R. 533: 65. 
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red, but there were no tears. R. 533:11. Roberts "assumed that the redness in 
[Tripp's] eyes was from crying/7 R. 533: 11. However, as found by the trial 
court, "[t]he more [Roberts] spoke with [Tripp], the more concerned he became 
that she was impaired by something/' R. 158: f^ 5; accord R. 533:14. He believed 
that Tripp "was impaired with some kind of alcohol or chemical" because (1) the 
"redness in her eyes was not dissipating" as he would expect if it had been 
caused by crying; (2) "she was continually smoking," and (3) she exhibited no 
concern for the victim. R. 533: 14, 36. These facts, and Detective Roberts' 
assessment of them, were ignored by the court of appeals. 
Although the red eyes meant little to Roberts when he first arrived, they 
became significant when her eyes cleared from the tears but remained red. 
Moreover, the continual smoking explains the inability of the officers to smell 
the odor of alcohol and it is widely recognized that smoking is frequently used 
to mask, or attempt to mask, the odor of alcohol. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 
329 F.3d 399, 401 n.l (5th Cir. 2003) (officer testifying that "an individual may 
light a cigar or cigarette during a traffic stop to mask the odor of alcohol or 
drugs"); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.) (officer testifying 
that "lighting a cigarette is usually done to mask an incriminating odor"), cert, 
denied, 528 U.S. 981 (1999); United States v. Hindhaugh, 166 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 
1999) (unpublished opinion) (recognizing that "a freshly lit cigarette... is often 
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used to mask drug or alcohol odors"); State v. Feldbrugge, 50 P.3d 1067, 1068 
(Mont. 2002) (officer testifying that he could smell odor of alcohol after driver 
was asked to extinguish cigarette). 
Tripp's apparent lack of concern for the motorcyclist also added to the 
probable cause analysis. Common sense would suggest that an unhurt driver in 
a serious accident would exhibit significant concern for any victims suffering 
serious injury. Where such a driver does not exhibit that concern, it is 
reasonable to infer that the driver is instead preoccupied with the possibility 
police may discover evidence of guilt for driving under the influence. This is by 
no means a determinative factor, but certainly adds to the equation when 
considered in light of other factors. 
The court of appeals ignored another significant factor supporting a 
probable cause finding: Tripp pulled into the intersection in front of the 
motorcyclist, despite an unobstructed view. See R. 533: 42-43, 57, 59. When 
considered in light of the other factors, such carelessness suggests that her 
failure to recognize the danger was due to impairment. 
The court of appeals, however, also ignored the factor that carried the 
greatest weight in the probable cause equation—the trial court's factual finding 
that "[t]he victim advocate, Cecelia Budd, detected an odor of alcohol on the 
defendant while the defendant was seated in the family car" and that Brian 
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Davis, the blood technician, also "detected] an odor of alcohol from the 
defendant" when he spoke to her about a blood draw. R. 158: Tf Tf 8,13; accord R. 
533:76-79,83,86-87. The court of appeals also failed to take into account Budd's 
testimony that Defendant slurred her words while speaking with her. R. 533:84. 
These indicia of impairment, standing alone, were more than sufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause. The court of appeals7 holding that probable 
cause did not exist should thus be reversed. 
C. Exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw. 
Because the court of appeals found no probable cause, it did not address 
the question of whether an exigency justified the warrantless blood draw. 
Although the Court may remand the case to the court of appeals to address that 
issue, the more judicially efficient course would be to decide the matter itself. 
The warrantless blood draw was justified by the exigencies of the situation. 
"Whether exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless blood draw 
"depends on 'all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the 
nature of the search or seizure itself/" Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, *[[ 51 (quoting 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537). Relevant factors include the time it 
would take to obtain a warrant, the availability of a telephonic warrant, and the 
ongoing nature of the investigation. See id. at ^ 11, 54. In this case, Officer 
Roberts testified that it would take "a couple of hours" to obtain a warrant 
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because he would "have to review all the information with the officers at the 
scene,... call another detective to come and help [him] draft the warrant and go 
with [him] to review the warrant with the district attorney and then have it 
signed by a district court judge/' R. 533:18-19. Moreover, the accident occurred 
just before 7:00 p.m. on a Friday evening, see R. 533:5, when the courts would be 
closed. 
Most significantly, as in Rodriguez, "[o]ne fact dominates all others with 
respect to its relevance to whether the warrantless blood draw was reasonable: 
that [the victim] was expected to succumb to [his] injuries/' Rodriguez, 2007 UT 
15, f 57. "This fact significantly alterfs] the warrant acquisition calculus that a 
reasonable law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe an 
alcohol-related offense has occurred could be expected to apply." Id. The 
seriousness of the accident, together with the strong evidence of defendant's 
alcohol impairment, was "sufficient to establish that the interests of law 
enforcement outweighed ... [defendant's] privacy interests," justifying a 
warrantless blood draw under the exigent circumstances exception. Id. at ^ 60. 
-28-
III. 
BLOOD ALCOHOL EVIDENCE WOULD HAVE INEVITABLY 
BEEN DISCOVERED PURSUANT TO A SEARCH WARRANT 
In reversing the trial court's order denying Tripp's motion to suppress, 
the court of appeals also rejected the State's inevitable discovery claim. Tripp, 
2008 UT App 388, ^ 1f 23-25. The court concluded that the State's argument that 
it would inevitably have discovered the blood alcohol evidence [pursuant to a 
warrant] is conjectural at best/7 Id. at f 24. In support of this conclusion, the 
court held that "[t]he record does not indicate that a warrant would actually 
have been issued in this case or that the desired blood test results would 
actually have been obtained thereby/7 Id. The court deemed as insufficient 
evidence that Detective Roberts would pursue a warrant but for the consent 
obtained through Brian Davis. Id. at f^ 25. The court of appeals, however, 
misapprehended the burden imposed under State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 76 
P.3d 1159, and it again ignored evidence probative of the issue. 
"The inevitable discovery doctrine . . . enables courts to look to the facts 
surrounding the discovery of the tainted evidence and asks whether the police 
would have discovered the evidence despite the illegality/' Id. Topanotes 
explained that "'[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis 
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that the evidence should be received/" Id. at f^ 14 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 444). 
The court of appeals required a level of certainty that is not consistent with the 
preponderance of the evidence standard. 
The court of appeals asserts that" [gjiven the investigating officers' single-
minded focus on getting [Tripp] to consent to have her blood drawn, amassing 
facts to establish probable cause was simply not their objective." Tripp, 2008 UT 
App 388, ^ 22 n.9. While the focus of the officers during the first hour was 
undoubtedly to persuade Tripp to consent to a blood draw, the evidence is 
undisputed that Officer Roberts abandoned that focus, placed Tripp in a patrol 
car, and told her that he was going to obtain a warrant. R. 533: 16-17. Any 
doubt regarding his sincerity was eliminated when he tried to send Davis away 
upon his arrival at the scene shortly thereafter. Detective Roberts "apologized 
that he'd arrived/' told Davis that "it looked like it was going to take [him] a 
couple of hours to get the warrant/' and "offered to call him back once he 
obtained the warrant/7 R. 533: 18. Had Detective Roberts only been bluffing 
about the warrant to Tripp, he would have no recison to send Davis away. 
Detective Roberts' testimony also established the steps he was prepared to 
take had Tripp not consented to the blood draw. When asked why he thought it 
would take a couple of hours to secure a warrant, Detective Roberts testified 
that he "ha[d] to review all the information with the officers at the scene,. . . call 
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another detective to come and help [him] draft the warrant and . . . review the 
warrant with the district attorney [,] and then have it signed by a district court 
judge/ ' R. 533:18-19. 
The foregoing evidence was more than sufficient to establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Detective Roberts would have taken the 
necessary steps to secure a warrant had Tripp not consented to the blood draw. 
This case is not unlike Nix, where the Supreme Court endorsed the 
inevitable discovery doctrine. In Nix, Robert Williams was arrested in 
connection with the disappearance of a 10-year-old girl. Nix, 467 U.S. at 435. 
Police initiated a large-scale grid-search for the girl, but it was called off after 
Williams led police to her body. Id. at 435-36. Williams moved to suppress 
evidence of the body because his statements to police, which led them to the 
girl's body, were taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. 
at 437. The Supreme Court held that under the inevitable discovery doctrine, 
the evidence should not be suppressed. Id. at 440-50. Based on the record, the 
Court was "satisfied . . . that the volunteer search teams would have resumed 
the search had Williams not earlier led the police to the body and the body 
inevitably would have been found." Id. at 449-50. 
-31-
Similar to the situation in Nix, Detective Roberts "would have resumed" 
his pursuit of a warrant had Tripp "not earlier" consented to the blood draw 
and the blood-alcohol evidence "inevitably would have been found." Id. 
The court of appeals also questioned whether there was probable cause to 
support a warrant. However, as discussed in point II above, the facts available 
to the officers at the time were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. 
The State concedes that blood-alcohol evidence would have dissipated by the 
time Detective Roberts secured a warrant. However, at least some blood-alcohol 
evidence was likely to remain. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the appeal to the court 
of appeals for disposition of the second issue on direct appeal. 
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ORME, Judge: 
fl Alleging error in the denial of her pretrial motion to 
suppress evidence, Susan Tripp appeals from her jury conviction 
of automobile homicide. We conclude that the appeal is well-
taken, reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress 
evidence, and remand for a new trial. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 "The legal analysis of search and seizure cases is highly 
fact dependent." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 2, 103 P.3d 699. 
We therefore recite the facts in some detail. 
1J3 On April 23, 2004, Tripp was driving eastbound on the Old 
Bingham Highway in Salt Lake County, Utah. She stopped at the 
stop sign at the U-111 intersection and, after stopping, pulled 
out and collided with a motorcyclist traveling southbound on 
U-lll.1 The motorcyclist died soon after from injuries sustained 
in the crash. 
^4 Police and emergency personnel immediately arrived on the 
scene, including West Jordan Police Officer Saunders, who asked 
Tripp if he could obtain a blood sample from her. Although 
Officer Saunders testified at trial that he did not observe any 
signs indicating that Tripp was impaired and that he did not have 
any reasonable suspicion that she was under the influence of any 
substance, he testified that he seeks blood draws in serious 
accidents as a matter of course. And the trial court, in its 
findings, indicated that " [n]o officer detected the odor of 
alcohol on the defendant, nor did they observe any obvious signs 
of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred speech." Tripp 
denied consuming alcohol or prescription drugs when asked by 
Officer Saunders. 
f5 Tripp told Officer Saunders that she did not want to submit 
to a blood test because she did not like needles but tha'i she was 
willing to consent to a urinalysis. Officer Saunders then 
conferred with an automobile homicide investigator, Detective 
Roberts, informing him that Tripp was unwilling to submit to a 
blood draw because she was scared of needles. After some 
discussion, the two officers determined that a blood sample was 
necessary and decided to renew the effort to obtain Tripp's 
consent for a blood draw.2 
%6 Detective Roberts then approached Tripp and again asked for 
her consent to a blood draw, which she refused to provide--again 
citing her fear of needles. She renewed the offer to furnish a 
urine sample and, indeed, a blood sample--provided a needle was 
not used to obtain it. Detective Roberts told Tripp that he did 
not know of any other way to obtain blood and suggested that her 
fear of needles was something that could be worked around. 
Detective Roberts explained that the department's blood 
1. Trial testimony by experts put the motorcyclist's speed just 
prior to impact at about sixty miles per hour, the posted speed 
limit. 
2. The record is devoid of any indication that a Breathalyzer or 
Intoxilyzer test was considered--a rather curious fact given that 
Tripp was not generally uncooperative and stood ready to provide 
a urine sample or even a blood sample, provided a needle was not 
used. One might surmise that a suspect ready to provide a 
roadside urine sample would readily provide a breath sample 
instead, if given that choice. Nor did Officer Saunders or 
Detective Roberts at any time request that Tripp undergo any 
alternative tests, such as field sobriety tests. 
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technician was highly skilled and would be able to do the draw 
quickly and relatively painlessly. During this exchange, 
Detective Roberts observed that Tripp appeared nervous, was 
shaking, and had red eyes without any tears. Detective Roberts 
testified that he began to believe that Tripp was impaired, based 
on her apparent lack of concern for the victim, her continual 
smoking, and the fact that the redness in her eyes was not 
dissipating. He also acknowledged that it was normal for an 
individual involved in a serious accident to be shaky and 
nervous. 
f7 Because Detective Roberts's further attempts to obtain 
Tripp's consent were unsuccessful, he approached the department's 
victims' rights advocates, whose presence is often requested at 
the scene of serious accidents, for assistance, to see "if they 
could calm [Tripp] down and . . . have her become more relaxed to 
the idea of having a blood draw." In the presence of Tripp's 
family--who had arrived at the scene a few minutes after the 
accident--and the advocates, Detective Roberts again asked Tripp 
to submit to a blood draw, and Tripp "adamantly refused to 
submit." Based on this refusal and protestations from Tripp's 
family at his repeated requests for a blood draw, Detective 
Roberts took Tripp into custody,3 removing her from her vehicle 
and placing her in the back of a police vehicle. Detective 
Roberts told Tripp that she was now in custody and that he was 
going to obtain a warrant and force the blood draw. Detective 
Roberts, however, never tried to secure the warrant because the 
blood technician, Brian Davis, arrived on the scene immediately 
after this exchange. 
f8 Detective Roberts explained the situation to Davis--that 
Tripp would not consent, that it was going to take several hours 
to obtain a warrant, and that he would call Davis back once the 
warrant had been obtained. Upon learning that Tripp refused 
consent only because of her fear of needles, Davis replied, 
"[W]ell, if that's all it is, let me talk to her. I'm usually 
pretty good at getting them to work around their fear of 
needles." Davis then went to talk with Tripp in the back of 
Officer Monson's patrol car. 
3. Throughout the briefs, both parties seem to use the concepts 
of "arrest" and "custody" interchangeably. Indeed, at the 
suppression hearing, Detective Roberts testified both that he 
took Tripp into "custody" and that he put her under arrest. 
Because the parties consistently characterize Tripp's custody as 
amounting to an arrest, we have no occasion to consider whether 
her detention was only a "level two" investigative detention. 
See generally State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 21, 164 P.3d 397. 
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^9 Davis tried to reassure Tripp of the relative ease and 
painlessness of the blood draw procedure. Tripp insisted that 
she was afraid and that even her own doctor would not draw her 
blood because of her fear. Davis testified that he thought he 
would be able to obtain her consent based on his reassurances, 
told this to Detective Roberts, and said, "I really think we can 
probably go ahead and do this. We've got her reassured and 
talked into this[.]M Davis then put a tourniquet on Tripp's arm 
to see "if we can find a spot that would be easy to do this," to 
which Tripp responded, "Okay, we'll go ahead and do that." Tripp 
stuck her arm out for Davis to apply the tourniquet. Davis told 
her that he found an easy site and that "we can go ahead and 
[take] care of this." Davis testified that Tripp probabLy did 
not know that he had his equipment ready and that he was prepared 
to draw her blood and that he "just kind of stuck her with the 
needle as quick as [he] could and got the blood done." "During 
the draw, Tripp was in a police car with an officer outside the 
door covering her eyes, a victims' rights advocate kneeling in 
front of her holding one of her hands, and Davis outside the car 
door holding her arm in such a way that she could not see it. 
Cecilia Budd, the victims' rights advocate who was with her, 
consistently reassured Tripp and told her that she had seen Davis 
draw blood before and that he was very good. After the draw, 
Tripp became calm and was surprised that the blood draw was done. 
^10 Officer Monson, who witnessed the blood draw, testified that 
"[Tripp] looked terrified. She had talked to us about her fear 
of needles and she looked terrified." He also testified that she 
was "pulling away. She was crying," but that she had "offered 
her arm." Budd testified that, at times, Tripp was 
uncontrollably crying. The blood draw showed a metabolite of 
cocaine and a blood alcohol level just above the legal limit. 
i[ll The State charged Tripp with automobile homicide, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-207(2), see 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2) (Supp. 2007), and with failure to 
yield the right of way, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code section 41-6-72.10(3), see Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
72.10(3) (1998) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-902 
(2005)). Tripp moved to suppress the blood test results. After 
an evidentiary hearing, the motion to suppress was denied. The 
trial court found that Tripp voluntarily consented to the blood 
draw, that her initial refusal was based "solely on her fear of 
needles, and [that] the evidence demonstrates that at the time of 
the blood draw the defendant's fear was resolved." Having been 
convicted following a jury trial, Tripp now appeals. 
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ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
fl2 Tripp argues that the trial court erred in denying her 
motion to suppress. Specifically, Tripp challenges the trial 
court's finding that she consented to the blood draw.4 "We 
review the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision 
to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly 
erroneous standard. However, we review the trial court's 
conclusions of law based on these findings for correctness[.]" 
State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 8, 6 P.3d 1133 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Further, we grant no 
deference to the trial court in its application of the law to its 
factual findings. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, % 15, 103 P.3d 
699.5 
ANALYSIS 
f13 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures, including in situations where blood is drawn from a 
suspect and then analyzed. See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 
292 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass fn, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989)), cert, denied, 982 
P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). "[S]earches conducted . . . without 
[warrants] . . . are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). Such exceptions include 
searches based on valid consent, see State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 
684, 687 (Utah 1990), and searches based on probable cause where 
4. It was suggested from the bench during oral argument before 
this court that perhaps Tripp had consented to providing a blood 
sample, just not to the method employed in extracting it, and 
that given that her articulated concern was on that basis rather 
than protections enshrined in the Fourth or Fifth Amendments, the 
blood draw might constitute a battery but should not trigger 
evidentiary suppression. That angle was not pursued by the 
State, perhaps because of the reality that blood can only be 
extracted by means of a needle, and we are aware of no authority 
supporting the notion that it is conceptually possible to consent 
to a blood draw while withholding consent to being pricked with a 
needle. 
5. Tripp also argues that the trial court erred in not allowing 
the jurors to consider whether the motorcyclist's conduct was a 
superseding cause of the accident. Given our disposition, we 
need not address this issue. 
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exigent circumstances obviate the need for a warrant, see State 
v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, f 16, 156 P.3d 771. 
I. Consent 
fl4 We start with consideration of whether Tripp consented 
voluntarily to the blood draw. "[C]onsent which is not 
voluntarily given is invalid." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. See 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973); Bredehoft, 
966 P.2d at 292-93. The appropriate standard to determine 
whether consent is voluntary "is the totality of the 
circumstances test." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 56r 63 P.3d 
650. "Under the totality of the circumstances test, a court 
should carefully scrutinize both the details of the detention, 
and the characteristics of the defendant." Id. (citing 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248). "Consent is not voluntary if it 
is obtained as 'the product of duress or coercion, express or 
implied.'" State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, <| 47, 37 P.3d 1073 
(citation omitted). "'[W]e further look to see if there is clear 
and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and 
freely given.'" Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 293 (citation omitted). 
"In other words, a person's will cannot be overborne, nor may his 
'capacity for self-determination [be] critically impaired.'" 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, % 57 (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). The State, of course, has the burden of establishing 
that consent was validly given. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687. 
^15 "Voluntariness is primarily a factual question, and the 
analysis used to determine voluntariness is the same without 
regard to whether the consent was obtained after illegal police 
conduct." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993) 
(citation omitted). Thus, if we determine that Tripp did not 
voluntarily consent to having her blood drawn, we need not reach 
the issue of "whether the consent was obtained by police 
exploitation of [a] prior illegality." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. 
See also Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262. The State argues that Tripp 
voluntarily consented to a warrantless blood draw in light of the 
totality of the circumstances. We disagree. 
1il6 Given the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that 
there is "clear and positive testimony" that Tripp 
"unequivocal[ly] and freely" consented to having her blood drawn. 
See Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 293 (citation omitted). After 
refusing to submit to a blood draw several times--to Officer 
Saunders, to Detective Roberts, and to Brian Davis--Tripp was 
informed that she was in custody, removed from the presence of 
her family, and placed in a police car. Detective Roberts 
testified that she was arrested because "the more [the officers] 
tried to convince her, the more defiant she became . . . and we 
were losing control of the situation." She was told that if she 
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did not submit, a warrant would be obtained and she would be 
forced to give a blood sample. A warrant was never sought, 
however, because the blood technician, Brian Davis, told 
Detective Roberts, "I really think we can probably go ahead and 
do this." When Tripp extended her arm prior to the blood test, 
to the extent the gesture was voluntary at all under the 
circumstances, it was in response to Davis's telling her that he 
was going to apply the tourniquet and see if he could find an 
easy spot to draw blood. Davis even testified that he was not 
sure that Tripp knew that he had his blood drawing equipment 
ready and was prepared to draw her blood when she extended her 
arm. Once he found an easy site to draw from, he told her "we 
can go ahead and [take] care of this," and he proceeded to 
immediately draw her blood without an express indication of her 
consent and without first allowing her to reaffirm, yet again, 
her refusal to consent. 
fl7 The State contends that Tripp's failure to immediately 
withdraw her arm must be taken as a clear indication of her 
consent. We cannot agree. During the blood draw, Tripp was 
surrounded by people working for the State--she was in a police 
car with an officer outside the door covering her eyes, a 
victims' advocate kneeling in front of her holding one of her 
hands, and the blood technician outside the car holding her arm 
where she could not see it. All the while Tripp was, according 
to the witnesses, terrified, crying, and panicked. Given the 
context of the threat of a forced blood draw, her arrest by the 
police, and the presence and participation of the State's many 
actors during the blood draw, we cannot say that Tripp 
voluntarily consented to have her blood drawn simply because she 
failed to retract her arm in the instant between when Davis said 
"we can go ahead and [take] care of this "--an ambiguous comment 
as concerns the timing of the intended blood draw in any event--
and when he inserted the needle. Indeed, Officer Monson, the 
officer who witnessed the draw, testified that although Tripp 
initially offered her arm to Davis, "[s]he was pulling away," and 
"[s]he was crying. I tried to shield her eyes so [she] wouldn't 
look at the needle." The State argues that this is a natural 
response from someone who fears needles. We think, however, that 
given the context of her continuous refusals to submit to a blood 
draw, her expressed fear of needles, her arrest, the threat that 
she would be forced to provide the blood as soon as a warrant was 
obtained,6 and her crying and pulling away during the blood draw, 
6. Although in many cases such a "threat" would be neither 
inaccurate nor coercive, see, e.g., State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 
1196, 1207 (Utah 1995); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273-74 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), this is not such a case. Here, as 
(continued...) 
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the State has failed to meet its burden and to demonstrate that 
Tripp voluntarily gave consent under the totality of the 
circumstances.7 See generally Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687. 
II. Exigent Circumstances 
1[l8 The State next asks us to affirm Tripp's conviction because 
Detective Roberts was justified in "forcing a blood draw under 
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement." 
While this court "may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record," State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, fl 11, 173 P.3d 213 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), we do not agree 
that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement justified the warrantless blood draw in this case.8 
fl9 A generally recognized exception to the warrant reqiirement 
is the one referred to as "exigent circumstances." See State v. 
Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, % 16, 156 P.3d 771. But to justify a 
warrantless search based on exigent circumstances, there must 
still be probable cause. See State v. Vallasenor-Meza, 2005 UT 
App 65, % 9, 108 P.3d 123 ("[A] warrantless search . . . is 
constitutionally permissible where probable cause and exigent 
circumstances are proven.") (first alteration in original) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Comer, 
2002 UT App 219, \% 21, 24, 51 P.3d 55 (same), cert, denied, 59 
P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). In other words, the exigencies cf a 
situation may excuse the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a 
warrant be obtained, but not the requirement that a search be 
premised on probable cause. 
6. (...continued) 
discussed in Part II, there was no demonstrated probable cause to 
justify an involuntary blood draw. 
7. This case stands in stark contrast to State v. Bredehoft, 966 
P.2d 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 8£ (Utah 
1999) , where we readily agreed with the State that a defendant 
who offered his arm to a blood technician had consented to the 
blood draw. See id. at 293. In that case, the defendant offered 
no resistance, the defendant did not say "no" or object in any 
way, and the defendant's blood was taken in a much less coercive 
environment, i.e., the defendant was in the back of an ambulance 
with only one officer present. 
8. Neither, apparently, did the trial court, which premised its 
decision entirely on consent. 
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^20 Probable cause exists when "an officer . . . believe [s] that 
the suspect has committed or is committing an offense." Desipain, 
2007 UT App 367, f 9 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). The facts surrounding a probable cause determination 
are examined in light of the totality of the circumstances. See 
id. 
f21 Exigent circumstances may exist when there is "an urgency to 
acquire evidence that falls outside the ordinary course of law 
enforcement," Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, % 16, such as situations 
where obtaining a warrant would place officers or the public at 
an unacceptable risk or where the destruction of essential 
evidence is imminent, see id. And where what is sought to be 
searched is a person's body, "sufficient probable cause exists 
only [when there is] 'a clear indication that evidence will be 
found as a result of the search.'" State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, 
f 22, 147 P.3d 425 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 770 (1966) ) . 
f22 On the record before us, we cannot say that the totality of 
the circumstances established probable cause to search Tripp's 
body for incriminating evidence, i.e., to effect the blood draw. 
Officer Saunders testified that he did not have a reasonable 
suspicion or belief that Tripp was intoxicated or under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol. Detective Roberts testified that 
he was only asked by Officer Saunders to help obtain consent and 
that he was not given any information that rose to the level of 
probable cause. Detective Roberts further testified that while 
he observed that Tripp had red eyes, possibly from crying, and 
that she was nervous and shaking, he did not observe slurred 
speech, smell the odor of alcohol, or conduct any field sobriety 
tests. Officer Monson testified that he did not smell alcohol or 
observe any signs of impairment. Significantly, in its findings 
of fact, the trial court found that " [n] o officer detected the 
odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they observe any 
obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred 
speech." Thus, the State has not met its burden of demonstrating 
that there was probable cause to believe that Tripp had committed 
an alcohol-related offense at the time her blood was drawn 
without her consent,9 and we thus have no occasion to determine 
9. Whether or not sufficient evidence to establish probable 
cause for a blood draw could have been garnered is an entirely 
different matter. Given the investigating officers' single-
minded focus on getting Tripp to consent to have her blood drawn, 
amassing facts to establish probable cause was simply not their 
objective. Had it been, they could have employed field sobriety 
tests and perhaps a Breathalyzer or Intoxilyzer test to develop 
probable cause for taking a sample of Tripp's blood. 
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whether sufficient exigent circumstances existed to excuse 
obtaining a warrant. See Alverez, 2006 UT 61, % 21. 
III. Inevitable Discovery 
J^23 Additionally, the State contends that Tripp's blood alcohol 
content would inevitably have been discovered and that we should 
therefore affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. The crux 
of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that since "'tainted 
evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an 
independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably 
would have been discovered.'" State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 
1 14, 76 P.3d 1159 (citation omitted). However, "there must be 
some 'independent basis for discovery,' and 'the investigation 
that inevitably would have led to the evidence [must] be 
independent of the constitutional violation.'" Id. f 16 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
f24 The State's argument that it would inevitably have 
discovered the blood alcohol evidence is conjectural at best. 
The record does not indicate that a warrant would actually have 
been issued in this case or that the desired blood test results 
would actually have been obtained thereby.10 "For courts 
confidently to predict what would have occurred, . . . there must 
be persuasive evidence of events or circumstances apart from 
those resulting in illegal police activity that would have 
inevitably led to discovery." Id. 
[^25 There is no such persuasive evidence here. Indeed, the only 
evidence relevant to securing a warrant was that Officer Saunders 
did not believe a warrant was required in serious accidents, that 
Detective Roberts threatened to obtain a warrant and force a 
blood draw, and that Detective Roberts thought obtaining a 
warrant would take a few hours. In any event, we have already 
held that the record before us does not establish a basis for 
concluding that there was probable cause to justify a forcible 
blood draw. We therefore cannot say that Detective Roberts would 
have necessarily been able to obtain a warrant based on the 
available evidence, and thus we decline to affirm on the basis of 
the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
10. Detective Roberts told Brian Davis it would be several hours 
before a warrant could be obtained, during which time the alcohol 
in Tripp's system would be dissipating. 
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CONCLUSION 
f26 We reverse the trial court's denial of Tripp's motion to 
suppress the blood test results because the State did not meet 
its burden of proving that her consent was voluntary. We also 
decline to affirm on the exigent circumstances rationale offered 
by the State because the State did not demonstrate that there was 
probable cause for a forcible blood draw. Nor does the 
inevitable discovery doctrine provide a proper basis on which to 
affirm. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the motion to 
suppress and remand for a new trial or such other proceedings as 
may now be appropriate. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
112 7 WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
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Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, having come before this Court for 
hearing in the above entitled manner on February 25, 2005, and Oral Argument on April 
18, 2005, in which Defendant was represented by counsel, Barton J. Warren, and the 
State was represented by co-counsel, Kim Cordova and Sandi Jolinson. The Court having 
reviewed the parties' written briefs and considered oral arguments of counsel, the Court 
now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant was involved in an auto-motorcycle accident, which resulted in 
the death of Daniel Pracht. 
2. The defendant was asked to submit to a chemical test and stated that officers 
could test her blood if they did not use a needle. 
3. The defendant's initial refusal to take a blood test was based solely on her fear 
of needles. 
4. When speaking with Ofiicer Saunders, the defendant denied using alcohol or 
drugs and expressed her fear of needles. 
5. Detective Roberts talked with the defendant multiple times. The more he 
spoke with the victim, the more concerned he became that she was impaired 
by something. 
6. Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the 
defendant's eyes did not dissipate with time, she was nervous, she appeared to 
lack concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily. 
7. No officer detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they observe 
any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred speech 
8. The victim advocate, Cecelia Budd, detected an odor of alcohol on the 
defendant while the defendant was seated in a family car. 
9. The defendant was eventually placed in Detective Roberts un-marked vehicle 
and secluded from her family and friends because they wrere interfering with 
the investigation. 
10. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was seated in Detective Roberts 
unmarked vehicle. The defendant was seated halfway in the vehicle, with the 
door open and her legs outside the vehicle. 
11. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was not handcuffed or shackled. 
2 
12. At the time of the blood draw, Mr. Davis and Cecelia Budd were present, and 
neither was in uniform or armed. Officer Monson was also nearby, but he was 
not in uniform. 
13. Mr. Davis, the blood technician, spoke to the defendant about a blood draw 
and Mr. Davis could detect an odor of alcohol from the defendant. 
14. Mr. Davis reviewed with lie defendant her right to remain silent, her right to 
counsel, and her right to refuse the test. 
15. When asked by Mr. Davis if she would consent to the blood draw, the 
defendant voluntarily extended her arm. 
16. When Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood, she never tied to withdraw her 
ami and she never said "no" or "stop." 
17. When the blood draw was over, the defendant wras immediately calm and 
stated that the experience was not as bad as she thought it would be. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant's initial refusal was based solely on her fear of needles, and 
the evidence demonst'ates that at the time of the blood draw the defendant's 
fear wras resolved. 
2. The defendant voluntarily consented to a blood draw. 
3. The evidence obtained as a result of the blood draw is admissible. 
DATED this 3JL day of J ^ 2 0 0 5 . 
BY THE COURT: 
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